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Chapter 3
Boserup’s Theory on Technological Change
as a Point of Departure for the Theory
of Sociometabolic Regime Transitions
Marina Fischer-Kowalski, Fridolin Krausmann, Andreas Mayer
and Anke Schaffartzik
Abstract This chapter is devoted to the core theoretical propositions unfolded in
E. Boserup’s 1981 book Population and Technological Change and represents an
attempt to take these ideas further. The 1981 book makes an effort to provide a theo-
retical explanation for the full course of human history, from hunting and gathering
communities through various stages of agricultural societies right into the industrial
transformation. First we re-examine her own data, confirming her core thesis about
average agricultural output per area risingwith population density at the expense of
declining output per labour hour, but demonstrating a strong discontinuity at the
industrial end of her technology scale.Clearly, what is measured at this end, the tran-
sition to fossil fuel use in agriculture, leads to saving labour. Second, we explain our
theory of sociometabolic regime transitions and try to show how much this theory
learned from Boserup. This theory, though, supposes that it makes a fundamental
difference if societies base practically all of their processes on solar energy, its con-
version into plant biomass and, consequently, on agriculture as the key energy supply
sector, or if they base their processes on fossil fuel energy sources - this is a qualitative
leap beyond what Boserup introduces as gradual distinctions. In a third part, based
on our comparative research on resource use, we elaborate on three examples for
the lasting validity of Boserup’s arguments: on the non-linearity between population
growth and land requirements, on the transferability of this thesis to other resources
as well, and finally on the persistent relevance of population density as key factor
allowing for lower resource consumption. This chapter confirms Boserup’s role as
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an eminent theorist and analyst of the development trajectory of agrarian societies,
but also points to her weakness in understanding the industrial transformation.
Keywords agricultural change · population density · industrial transformation ·
sociometabolic regimes · land and labour intensity
3.1 Introduction
Ester Boserup’s 1965 book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth was well re-
ceived and resonated deeply (Boserup 1965). In contrast, Boserup’s most mature
and comprehensive book, 1981’s Population and Technological Change: A study of
Long-Term Trends (Boserup 1981), in all its complexity, seems to have received less
attention.
This chapter is devoted to the core theoretical propositions unfolded in this 1981
book and represents an attempt to take these ideas further. In her work Population and
Technological Change, Boserup not only had the ambition to elaborate and generalise
her ideas from 1965, she also made a number of attempts to explore the validity of
her arguments using quantitative analysis. She did so mainly using national-level
data (skilfully digging out the information on the few countries for which the data
were available at the time), analysing the interrelations of her two main variables—
population density presumably as the independent variable and technological change
as the dependent variable—as well as the joint impact of both on other variables. This
methodological approach that she helped pioneer is still very common, particularly
in the context of reports from international organizations, but the data situation has,
of course, much improved since.
What we attempt to show in this chapter is not only that the theory of so-
ciometabolic regime transitions genuinely builds upon Boserupian foundations (even
if it contradicts her preoccupation with gradualism) but also that data generated in the
context of material and energy flow accounting (Haberl et al. 2004) are very suitable
for putting her key propositions to empirical tests.
3.2 Boserup’s Main Theoretical Propositions,
and her Efforts at an Empirical Proof
In the preface, Boserup (1981) describes the claims of this book in relation to her
book on the conditions of agricultural growth (1965). Because the latter focuses
only on agricultural technology, it had to “abstain from the analysis of the effects of
technological change on population change. It therefore discussed only the effects
of population change, not its causes. This book deals with all types of population-
linked technologies, and I have made an attempt to deal with both sides of the
interrelationship.” (Boserup 1981, p. ix) Her later book, she says, has a broader
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scope; whereas the earlier book focuses exclusively on agricultural societies, the
later volume also deals briefly with pre-agricultural communities and, in much more
detail, with societies in early stages of industrialization. However, even in the later
book, she makes “no attempt to discuss the most recent technological innovations in
the highly industrialised societies.” (Boserup 1981, p. x) “This book is not a revision
of The Conditions of Agricultural Growth,” Boserup points out, “but only an attempt
to broaden and deepen it.” Discussing the criticisms she received for her previous
work, she self-confidently asserts “that I was on the right track and have nothing to
regret, so far as the theory is concerned” (ibid.).
In other words, the 1981 book makes an effort to provide a theoretical explanation
for the full course of human history, from hunting and gathering communities through
various stages of agricultural societies right into the industrial transformation. Its
overall structure complies with this ambition: a chapter on the theoretical framework
is followed by a historical chapter on population and technology in the ancient world.
She then discusses the role of demographic factors in European development and the
diffusion of industrial technologies. Finally, she deals with demographic transition
and technological change in the Third World.
Her basic theoretical framework for the core interrelation between demographic
dynamics and technological development reads as follows (Boserup 1981, p. 5 ff.):
Inventions, or the acceptance of spreading inventions, have a strong demand com-
ponent, and rapid population growth can generate such a demand. Thus, population
change induces inventions and technological change and also facilitates technolog-
ical change: more people available make doing things differently possible. There is
also a feedback loop in that technological change leads to further population change.
Increased population density in an area has a dual effect on the availability of life-
sustaining natural resources: On the one hand, it makes life easier because it allows
for burden sharing in accessing these resources. On the other hand, in the long run,
the ratio of natural resources to the population decreases. “One or the other tendency
may prevail” (Boserup 1981, p. 5). As a result of both tendencies, an increase in
population density “provides an incentive to replace natural resources by labour and
capital” (Boserup 1981, p. 6).
These are the key theoretical propositions that lead her through the rich material
throughout her book. She operationally defines her key variables: population density
and technological change. Both variables are measured at a national level, using the
few internationally available data of her time. Density is fairly straightforward: she
defines 10 density classes (in persons per km2 each distinguished from the next by
factor 2: 0–1, 1–2, 2–4, 4–8 . . . 128–256, > 256) that she will later group together.
Next, she specifies technological levels (Boserup 1981, p. 12 ff.). Among the
indicators she uses, per capita energy consumption (in coal equivalents), which can
be considered practically equivalent to the amount of fossil fuel use, comes first.
Next is the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants (again in its dependency
upon electricity bound to fossil fuel use), an indicator of extending communication
beyond the local community and of interconnectedness. Average life expectancy, as
an indicator of health infrastructure, food supply and literacy rates, rounds out the
set. She ranks the countries by each indicator, constructs an index in which each















per capita energy use in 10 
kilos coal equiv. 
# telephones/1000 
persons 
life expectancy at birth 
% literates 15 years old 
and older 
Fig. 3.1 Indicator values by technology level. (According to Boserup 1981, p. 13, Table 2.3;
calculated as indices, value of technology level I = 1)
indicator carries equal weight, and finally puts the countries into 5 groups by the
resulting index, with each group containing an equal number of countries (for the
year 1970) (Fig. 3.1).
Boserup presents the relation between indicators and technology groups in the
form of a table. In general, the technology groups exhibit a rise in life expectancy,
literacy, and “connectivity” from one group to the next using different levels of fossil
fuel inputs. What becomes much more apparent when presented graphically is the
relative homogeneity of technology groups I–III according to these indicators. Then,
there is an increase through group IV to group V clearly related to fossil energy
use. Thus, what she shows here are not the subtle differences within the agrarian
regime that were her original focus (differentiation by fallow periods and gradual
intensification of land use) but the progressive use of fossil fuels as a source of
energy.1
In her next step, she puts her core hypothesis of 1965, that high population density,
far from making people starve, moves them in a position to advance technologically,
to a test with these data. The results (see graph in Fig. 3.2) do not convince her. She
feels there is no longer as close a correlation as between population density and high
technological levels as “there seems to have been before the industrial revolution”
(Boserup 1981, p. 14), but even now she sees a pronounced inverse relationship only
happening rarely, recognizing that “it became possible for a sparsely populated area
by very rapid technological development to become the leading industrial nation in
little more than a century.” (Boserup 1981, p. 144)
Clearly, the proportion of high-density countries is highest among the top tech-
nology group, but the proportion of low-density countries does not continuously
1 This transition is also reflected in several other tables in chapter 1 (Boserup 1981); there is never a
more or less steady increase from group 1 to group 5. However a consistent pattern can be observed
that groups 1–3 are fairly similar and then there is rapid change through 4 to 5. She fails to register
this explicitly.
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Fig. 3.2 Population density and technological level in 1970 (∼ 100 countries). (According to
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Fig. 3.3 The overall effect of density (a), and technology (b) on output. (According to Boserup
1981, p. 27, Table 3.13; number of countries per cell very small (1–4)
decline with technological advancement—there must be other factors involved as
well. The issue could be resolved more easily if she drew a theoretical dividing line
between population dynamics and technological advancement under agrarian regime
conditions, where her hypothesis is highly plausible and corresponds very well to
historical observation, and the roles of population dynamics under industrializing
and industrial conditions that are somehow qualitatively different.2
Even the findings concerning her core thesis that average agricultural output per
area rises in dependency upon population density at the expense of declining output
per labour hour confirm her theory, but still there is a strong discontinuity with
technology level V, the industrial end of the scale (see Fig. 3.3).
Yield per worker does not depend much on population density but strongly depends
on technology. Density plays a role only in technology group V (with output per
2 Practically, of course, this would always be blurred because there is often a protracted transition
phase between one system state to the other.
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worker declining as predicted). Clearly, what this technology scale measures, i.e.,
transition to fossil fuel use, reflects itself in an emphasis on saving labour.
From multivariate and bivariate perspectives (Fig. 3.3), one sees output per hectare
rise with population density and output per worker decline. This finding confirms
Boserup’s core theoretical assumption. However, with technology groups, the old
assumption does not hold; both output per hectare and output per worker increase
with the technological level because a technological level is not defined as improved
technology within agricultural society but as the degree of transition towards the use
of fossil fuels.
Why does Ester Boserup not draw a dividing line between systems functioning
differently, as she herself repeatedly recognises?
She clearly disapproved of the arrogance of modernist exceptionalism in bringing
technological innovation and change to “traditional” communities that would other-
wise be static. For this reason, perhaps, she opposed the dichotomous distinction of
“modern” and “traditional” altogether and introduced a much richer set of qualitative
distinctions of food supply systems, differentiated by what she considers the decisive
variable for land use intensity: fallow periods (Boserup 1965, p. 15 f., 1981, p. 18 f.).
This line of reasoning was highly innovative vis-à-vis the simplistic distinctions of
classical political economy between cultivated land and unused land and the derived
processes of extension (cultivating additional land) and intensification (increasing
output) and was inspirational for contemporary land use science (see Chap. 5 by Erb
et al. in this volume). Nevertheless, it still shares with the classics a particular blind
spot: an unawareness of the crucial role of sources of energy.
For her, contrary to mainstream thinking, tools and their improvement, as well as
input factors such as fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, play a secondary role. Her
core argument, simplified, is that population growth increases density and makes it
necessary to find ways to use land more intensively, which is equivalent to reducing
fallow periods (up to annual multicropping), which in turn drives technological
development; solutions also rely on the availability of more people and more labour
power.
It makes a fundamental difference if societies base practically all of their processes
on solar energy, its conversion into plant biomass and, consequently, agriculture as
the key energy supply sector, or if they base their processes on fossil fuel energy
sources. In the first case, societies as a whole absolutely depend on a positive high
EROI (energy return upon energy investment3) from agriculture, and if it is low, such
societies are constrained in their complexity. In the second case, they can afford to
subsidise agriculture energetically. For agriculture, the subject of much of Boserup’s
writing, this makes a huge difference, a qualitative leap beyond what she introduces
as gradual distinctions. In the following paragraph, we will explain how we, building
upon Boserup’s ideas, argue the need for drawing a qualitative distinction between
what we call agrarian and industrial sociometabolic regimes.
3 On the concept of EROI, see (Hall et al. 1986, p. 28)
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3.3 Understanding Qualitative Change:
Sociometabolic Regimes
The metabolism of all pre-industrial societies is based on the use of biomass and thus
upon the ability of plant organisms to utilise solar energy via photosynthesis to create
energy-rich material from carbon dioxide, water and mineral compounds. In the form
of nutrition and animal feed, biomass provides the energetic basis for sustaining the
existence of humans and their livestock and can be converted into mechanical energy.
Combustion (burning fuelwood, for example) provides space and process heating for
domestic households (cooking), mining (metal smelting) and light. The conversion
of heat into mechanical energy was not possible prior to the invention of the steam
engine; thus, the availability of mechanical energy was subject to strict limitations.
Water and wind power play an important yet very much subordinate role in terms
of quantity. With few exceptions,4 biomass was by far the most important energy
source until the industrial revolution, generally accounting for 99 % of all available
primary energy.
The production of available energy is based upon the controlled transformation of
ecosystems by labour with the aim of increasing the utilisable yield of biomass; i.e.,
upon the colonisation of nature. The basic precondition for this form of subsistence
is that a positive energy yield (EROI) is obtained from agrarian activity; through
agrarian land-use, significantly more energy in the form of biomass must be produced
than is expended in the form of human labour (and prerequisite energetic expenditures
such as nutrition). It has been estimated that in Central Europe before the beginning
of industrialisation in the agrarian economy, an EROI of c. 10 to 1 was achieved
(Krausmann 2004; Leach 1976). Any surplus may be used to supply the non-agrarian
sectors of society—that is, to provide nutrition and fuelwood for urban centres, as
well as feed for the draught animals that have to transport all this material.
The higher the surplus, the more complex the possible societal structures become.
However, this surplus is never particularly high because a system must be very well
organised for the work of 10 farm families to be able to sustain more than 1–2 other
households (such as aristocratic landowners, craftspeople or bureaucrats). Under the
agrarian regime, reactions to increases in food demand, which are usually caused
by population growth, initially involve expanding the area dedicated to agrarian
production—and this may often lead to attempts to capture new territories. As a last
resort, where land is scarce and territory limited, the option remains to apply a greater
investment of labour to the same land area with the aim of achieving a greater yield,
in other words, the intensification of land-area use. However, the yield per invested
hour of labour declines as intensity of use increases and asymptotically approaches
a physical limitation, from which point there is no benefit to be achieved by further
4 In the seventeenth century in the Netherlands, for example, the exploitation of large peat deposits,
intensive use of wind energy and a dense network of waterways suitable for shipping formed the
energetic basis for an exceptional economic development, the Dutch Golden Age. It is estimated
that during this period, up to 1.5 million tonnes of peat were dug annually, involving the excavation
of 700 ha of peatland each year. Peat is a source—albeit not one of the oldest—of fossil energy.
See (De Zeeuw 1978).
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intensification. In other words, growth is possible but leads to a diminishing marginal
utility of labour. When this limit is reached, we find the “typical” picture of agrarian
societies, in which the majority of the population, including children, incessantly
performs demanding physical work while still suffering from shortages of essential
resources. This logic, which Ester Boserup has studied on a worldwide basis and
of which she provides a detailed description, represents a fundamental limitation of
societal development in agrarian regimes: as a rule, growth in this regime eventually
leads, despite progress made regarding methods of husbandry and plant cultivation,
to the stagnating or even diminishing availability of per capita material and energy
resources.
Furthermore, the absence of the possibility to transform heat energy into mechan-
ical work limits the degrees of freedom. Mechanical work can only be performed
through the physical work of humans, animals and water/wind energy; thus, the pro-
ductivity that was thereby attainable remained relatively low.5 Altogether, the size
and structure of societal metabolism and its spatial differentiation were subject to
limitation through the controlled solar energy system. In Europe, before the begin-
ning of the Industrial Revolution, 2–4 t of raw material and 30–70 gigajoules (GJ)6 of
primary energy were appropriated per capita and year, whereby biomass accounted
for over 80 % of all material and 95 % of all energy inputs: food for human popu-
lations, livestock feed and wood for construction and fuel. Regional differences in
metabolism were related in particular to the varying relevance of holding livestock
and climatic conditions.7
Starting in seventeenth century England, increased use of coal led to the develop-
ment of a new energy system. At the core of this energy transition was a transition
from the use of energy flows with low power density in the form of biomass that
is regrown annually to the exploitation of large-scale energy deposits that had ac-
cumulated over geological eras and existed in a concentrated form as coal, with a
high power density (Smil 2003). Initially, coal was used solely as an often quite un-
popular fuel for stoves in the households of manufacturing workers in urban centres,
whose increasing requirements could not be supplied by fuelwood alone. Fortunately,
coal supplies in England were found close to these centres, and coal could also be
transported at low cost via waterways.8
5 One should imagine that a Pharaoh with 2000 labourers to build the pyramids had little more
capacity at his disposal as a worker would today using a large road construction machine.
6 One Joule represents 0.24 calories and is a very small unit. A megajoule (MJ) = 106 J, a gigajoule
(GJ) = 109 J and an exajoule (EJ) = 1018 J. The energy content (calorific value) of 1 kg of wood is
roughly 15 MJ, that of coal is 20–30 MJ and that of petroleum is 45 MJ.
7 The highest biomass conversion rates are seen in pastoral societies with a very high per capita
livestock holding and the lowest are recorded in societies whose means of subsistence rely predom-
inantly on human physical work and plant-based diets (for example, in the rice-cultivating societies
of south and southeast Asia).
8 These densely populated manufacturing centres had come into existence because, as early as the
seventeenth century, the English owners of large estates found it more profitable to use their land
for the production of the raw materials of the textile industry than to produce foodstuff for a rural
population, which, in their eyes at least, was seen as partly expendable.
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In nearly all other world regions, by contrast, only regional urban-industrial cen-
tres were affected by this metabolic transition. Accordingly, the average per capita
coal use remained negligible in countries such as India, China or Brazil even at the
beginning of the twentieth century, comprising far less than 100 kg/capita and year.
Indeed, the European countries that were in the process of industrialising had an
active interest in using colonialism to ensure that other world regions played a role
as suppliers of cheap agricultural products and other raw materials, as well as outlet
markets for growing industrial production and certainly not in allowing them to par-
ticipate in industrial development themselves (see further discussion on this theme
below).
Later, steam engines enabled the conversion of coal into mechanical power, which
led to a dramatic increase in the available capacity compared to what had existed
under the previous regime. The possibility of extracting, transporting, processing and
consuming materials underwent radical change, and an entirely new form of societal
metabolism came into being as a result. In addition to biomass, huge quantities of
coal, construction materials and ore were extracted and processed. In the United
Kingdom, materials used, for example, increased from 60 to 400 million tonnes
per year between 1750 and 1900. Population growth during this phase happened
at a somewhat slower pace than the increase in material and energy use. For the
first time in history, there was rapidly growing demand for non-agricultural workers.
The mechanical performance of large coal-powered machines created conditions that
produced an immense number of jobs required for final manufacturing. During this
phase, although there was a rise in per capita material and energy consumption, it
did not produce an increase in mass prosperity but was instead channelled into the
expansion of the factory system and into exports.
Coal represented a first important step towards emancipating the energy system
from the land area and removing traditional limitations on economic growth. Rolf
Peter Sieferle coined the vivid phrase “subterranean forest” for this phenomenon
(Sieferle 1982). He showed that the energy (calorific value) contained in the amount
of coal that was combusted annually in the United Kingdom by 1850 had already
reached the equivalent of the fuelwood that could be produced from a virtual forest
area the size of the entire country. By 1900, this amount had risen to an area equivalent
to a subterranean forest covering four times the land area of the entire country (see
Fig. 3.4). We may interpret this finding to mean that to maintain societal metabolism
at the same level, the United Kingdom would have required a territory four times
greater than its actual land area and entirely covered in forest for use.
However, coal use did not remove all the limitations of the solar energy system.
A very profound reliance upon the area-dependent resource of biomass remained in
place: the need for nutrition. Access to more (technical) energy had not in any sense
replaced human physical work but in fact had increased the demand for labour power
in need of nutrition. In a similar way, the railway did not replace the need for draught
and working animals; on the contrary, the wide-meshed network of railway lines,
in combination with an increase in transported goods and people, led to an increas-
ing demand for working animals. Stocks of draught animals grew continuously into
the twentieth century. Similarly, coal did indeed provide a substitute for fuelwood,
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Fig. 3.4 Coal use in the
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Coal use as virtual forest area
but more timber than ever before was required for building the railways and for the
emerging paper industry. Altogether, the demand for biomass grew paradoxically
alongside the transformation of the energy system to feed people and animals and
to supply new industries with raw material. At the same time, the potential for ex-
panding the cultivatable area was largely exhausted, and the means of raising area
productivity were limited. The most important limitation was the chronic shortage of
fertiliser. Although mineral fertilisers, such as guano, Chile saltpetre and superphos-
phate, were increasingly used in agriculture by the end of the nineteenth century, the
volumes employed were low and limited to special crops such as oranges or tobacco
and the supply of plant nutrients for most of the cultivated land still had to rely on
farm-internal means (manure, leguminous crops, etc.). Thus, a fundamental limi-
tation upon traditional agriculture remained in place, which, in spite of successful
biological innovations such as new cultivated plants and new land-use practices, led
to stagnating grain yields in the nineteenth century.
In the USA, a completely different development took place; a rapidly growing
population but an extremely low population density of only 2 persons per km2 meant
that with the expansion of the railway system, huge swathes of fertile prairie land
could be cultivated for food production. Within a few decades of homesteading, over
100 million ha of high-quality agricultural land were gained in the Midwestern USA
between 1850 and 1920, after the indigenous peoples, with their extensive land-
use practices, had been violently expelled (Cunfer 2005). The nutrient-rich soils of
the Great Plains allowed for high initial yields with little labour input. The labour
productivity of this system of agriculture was extraordinarily high and enabled a
small rural population to supply the densely populated urban centres on the coasts as
well as to export large quantities of foodstuff to Europe. By around 1880, the USA
was already exporting over 4 million tonnes of grain, providing basic nutrition for
over 20 million people (Krausmann and Cunfer 2009).

























































Oil, natural gas and others
Fig. 3.5 The establishment of new energy sources in the United Kingdom (1870–2006) (a), and
the United States (1750–2000) (b). (Data sources: Authors’ calculations based on Schandl and
Krausmann 2007, p. 97 (United Kingdom), and IEA 2008; Krausmann et al. 2009; Podobnik
1999). Note: In this diagram, the share of the total primary energy supply, represented by the
three fractions of biomass, coal and oil/natural gas (including other energy forms), is depicted. The
biomass fraction includes all biomass used as food for humans and livestock and biomass used for
all other purposes, together with fuelwood
Not only the agrarian productivity of a pioneer country but also another resource—
oil—positioned the USA to become the leading nation during the next phase of the
industrial transformation (Fig. 3.5).
3.3.1 The Green Revolution
As shown, in the nineteenth century, the USA was able to effectively compensate
the weaknesses of the English transformation model (i.e., difficulties in producing
sufficient food for a high-density and growing population) and to turn this to its
advantage. However, it became clear that this level of agricultural productivity had
no long-term potential and after only a few decades, ran up against massive ecological
limitations. The combination of large land areas with a low investment of labour was
only possible because the prairie soil, then being ploughed for the first time, contained
huge reservoirs of plant nutrients accumulated over a long historical period. These
reservoirs, however, quickly began to deplete in the first decades of ploughing. The
yields began to decrease, and enormous problems with erosion appeared (Cunfer
2005). However, in a situation where oil could be obtained cheaply and with a bundle
of technologies coupled to this new energy source, a new and successful agricultural
model was possible. The tractor allowed for the substitution of all animal labour and
a large proportion of human labour in agriculture, much as the motor saw raised the
speed of tree-felling in comparison with the axe by a factor of 100–1,000 (and thus
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enabled the rapid deforestation of the rainforests). The agrochemical industry, based
on petroleum and natural gas, helped to lift the chronic limitations on plant nutrients
from which agriculture was suffering. From the 1920s onwards, huge amounts of
atmospheric nitrogen were made available for agricultural use using the Haber-Bosch
process, which requires a high energy input (Smil 2001). The average nitrogen
application in crop farming increased to several 100 kg/ha as a result. Together with
industrial potassium, phosphate fertilisers, pesticides and successes in plant and
livestock breeding, area yields and labour productivity in agriculture were amplified
within a very short space of time (Grigg 1992).
Starting in the USA and disseminated by agricultural companies active on the
global market, these new agricultural methods were spread around the world under
the term green revolution.9 They found application in Europe after World War II. As
a result, the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture fell to 5 % or less.
The green revolution also took hold in large sectors of agriculture in the southern
hemisphere and helped create conditions in which global food production was able
to keep pace with the quadrupling of the world population in the twentieth century.
The industrialisation of agriculture required a massive transformation of the
agrarian landscape, which had to be rendered suitable for machine activity. This
transformation led to a range of specific environmental problems. The position of
agriculture in societal metabolism and the energy system changed fundamentally.
Industrialised agriculture requires a high energy input, and today, more energy is
invested in agricultural production than is subsequently obtained in the form of food,
which is partly due to the large quantity of high-quality agricultural produce that is
fed to livestock. In general, agriculture has been altered during the course of the so-
ciometabolic transformation from being the most important source of useful energy
to becoming an energy sink (Pimentel and Pimentel 1979). With the industrial trans-
formation, society has made itself dependent on abundant external energy sources
for the most important part of its metabolism, namely, the feeding of its population.
This industrial stage of agriculture does not comply with Boserup’s theory of
population growth driving technological innovation and leading to a substitution of
natural resources by labour and capital. Bringing a completely new natural resource
into play introduces a completely new pattern.
3.4 Examples of Later Research Findings that Could Have Been
Anticipated from Boserup’s Theory
3.4.1 Example 1: On the Non-Linearity Between Population
and Land Requirement
One of Boserup’s core ideas is inspirational: the anti-Malthusian message of a non-
linear relationship between the (growing) number of people and land requirement,
9 The term green revolution was first coined in 1968 by William S. Gaud, the director of the United
States Agency for International Development USAID. See also (Leaf 2004).





































Fig. 3.6 Development of global cropped area, average crop yields per unit area and population in
the twentieth century. Indexed Development from 1910 to 2005 (1910 = 1) (a), and average annual
growth rates for the period 1910–1950 and 1950–2005 (b). (Based on Krausmann et al. 2013).
Note: Since the green revolution, these changes have been achieved not by increasing human
labour inputs (on the contrary, the number of people globally working in agriculture has decreased)
but by increasing labour input in its technical form, namely direct or indirect energy input on the
basis of fossil fuels
with the key intervening variable being the intensification of use. This proposition
held on a global level throughout the twentieth century (Fig. 3.6). One must assume,
though, that generating more output on the same cropland was achieved by different
methods before and after the green revolution, with its fossil fuel-based inputs and
tools. Whereas before the green revolution, the mechanisms described in Boserup
(1965), namely reduced fallow periods and, in extreme cases, shifting to multicrop-
ping, at the expense of increasing labour investment, presumably dominated and
achieved an increase in output that could not quite keep up with population growth
(so that there still had to be a substantial expansion in cropland), after the green
revolution (i.e., from the late 1950s onward), the growth in yields far exceeded the
growth in cropland. In the most recent decades, however, yields have again grown
at a slower pace than the world population (Fig. 3.7).
During the heyday of the green revolution, the number of tractors increased two-
and-a-half fold, and the use of mineral fertilisers increased fivefold. Again, we see
a structural break from the late 1980s onward in which these inputs have stagnated
and the overall energy input in agriculture dropped and has remained stable on a
substantially lower level. If we relate this to the results shown in Fig. 3.8, it is
apparent that rises in crop yields and rises in fossil fuel-based inputs relate closely.
No doubt this may change again in the future; the increasing prices of fossil fuels (and
maybe even outright oil scarcity) and agricultural products may create a situation in
which more labour-intensive forms of agriculture regain their place in society.
One international mistake could have been avoided by looking more closely at
Boserup’s works. The original global estimates of land available for biofuels (“unused
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Fig. 3.7 Global trends in
agricultural inputs
1961–2005. (Source: FAO
2007; IEA 2008. Note: The
number of tractors is a
conservative estimate for the
















land”) were much too high (Haberl et al. 2010 provide an excellent overview).
Boserup would have taught them that on this populated planet, there is no such thing
as “unused land” (regardless of what it looks like on satellite images); the intensity of
land use is a matter of degree, with—for example—extensive pastures contributing
essentially both to the nutrition of people and to the fertilization of their cropland.
3.4.2 Example 2: Generalizing the Thesis of Non-Linearity
to Other Resources
An analogous argument may apply to the human use of other natural resources as
well: although population numbers are one of the strongest drivers of the require-















































































Fig. 3.8 Global primary energy use (a), and material use (b), 1900–2010. (Source: Krausmann
et al. 2009) (data update 2011)
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increasing efficiency, a certain degree of non-linearity in this relationship. Under the
agrarian sociometabolic regime (or agricultural societies, as Boserup would say), an
increasing population density allowed for urbanization, and urbanization both of-
fered the conditions for further technological development and required them (such
as fortifications, new means of transport and transport infrastructures, new weapons,
etc.). However, urbanization and a lifestyle beyond the daily toil of agriculture was
clearly limited by the low agricultural surplus that could be taxed from peasants,
limits to transportation (land transport for bulky materials could only cover a few
kilometres; ships were the only viable alternative), and limits to timber and fuel
wood that used to be quickly exhausted in the vicinity of urban centres. (See part
II in Boserup 1981, pp. 15–92; see also Sieferle 1982) Thus, once the basic infras-
tructural investments were completed, the requirements of natural resources (food,
feed, timber and fuelwood, fibres, clay, metals and mineral building materials) grew
at most at the pace of the population and, one may speculate, maybe often below for
scarcity and efficiency reasons. There was a certain built-in mechanism for territories
to grow but not a built-in mechanism for individual consumption to grow.10
The situation is very different in the industrial sociometabolic regime. There, tech-
nological innovations mainly reduce labour requirements and drive income (Ayres
and Warr 2009). The more resources for a certain service are saved through inno-
vation, the more resources are consumed overall (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos 2008).
During all of the twentieth century, marked by the expansion of the industrial regime,
the global resource consumption of energy and all other materials increased much
faster than the already very steep rise of the world population (see Fig. 3.8). In effect,
per capita consumption of natural resources almost tripled during this century, and
it is continuing to rise as the industrial regime expands to more and more countries.
All this could not have happened with biomass as the core source of energy.
Industrial agriculture uses large amounts of fossils to boost annual harvests of net
primary production by an order of magnitude (Haberl et al. 2007).
The rise of per capita energy and materials consumption, i.e., the non-linearity of
resource requirements with elasticities above 1 in relation to population growth, is
particularly pronounced in two phases (see Fig. 3.9). One phase is the period between
the world economic crisis in 1930 and the first oil crisis in 1972—this is precisely
the period of booming oil in the US, reconstruction after World War II in Europe, and
the worldwide spread of the so-called green revolution in agriculture (Pimentel et. al
1973). The other phase has been visible on a global level since the turn of the twenty-
first century, but regionally started much earlier: the rapid industrial transformation,
on a fossil fuel base, of a number of so-called emergent economies such as China,
Brazil, Korea or India.
The first decade of the new century was marked by a shift in resource prices; for the
first time in many decades, there was a steep trend upward (the long-term trend had
always been declining) for oil and gas, cereals, and many metals and minerals. In the
10 For the elites, growth of territory, of course, was the major mechanism for becoming richer;
however, compared to today, differences in consumption levels between the rich and the richer
were negligible.
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Fig. 3.9 Per capita global
energy and materials use
during the twentieth century.
(Source: Krausmann et al.

























































same decade, a major global financial crisis (which also exists today) and structural
shifts in world trade occurred (Dittrich and Bringezu 2010). If Ester Boserup had had
the chance to use these sociometabolic indicators for her analysis, what conclusions
would she have come up with? Would she have been able to maintain her generally
positive outlook on population growth and technological advancement?
3.4.3 Example 3: On the Role of Development and Population
Density in Driving Resource Use
Development, in the sense of a transition from an agrarian to an industrial regime,
implies a much more substantial increase in resource use than Boserup could be
aware of. On the basis of a number of historical and contemporary case studies,
several authors (Haberl et al. 2011; Krausmann et al. 2008) published the following
estimates (Table 3.1). Primary energy use11 per capita has increased by a factor
between 3 and 5, far beyond the range of any agrarian society; biomass use, although
absolutely not decreasing, only supplies 10–30 % of the energy used. The same holds
true for materials use—with the energy available, 3–5 times as much material can
be mobilised. In addition, the fraction of the population working in agriculture has
decreased from above 80 % to less than 10 %. With the demographic transitions that
have come along, population density has increased 3- to 10-fold, leading to a very
11 Measured as Domestic Energy Consumption (DEC), which includes, beyond the primary energy
from commercial sources as measured by TPES (total primary energy supply), the food and feed
energy consumed. Thus, it is a much better indicator for comparing energy requirements across
historical periods in which food/feed energy comprised most of the energy used.
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Table 3.1 Comparing the agrarian and the industrial regime: Population density, per capita resource
use and agricultural population. (Source: Krausmann et al. 2008)
Agrarian Industrial Factor
Energy use (DEC) per capita [GJ/cap] 40–70 150–400 3–5
Energy use (DEC) per area [GJ/ha] < 30 < 600 10–30
Biomass (share of DEC) [%] > 95 10–30 0.1–0.3
Material use (DMC) per capita [t/cap] 3–6 15–25 3–5
Material use (DMC) per area [t/ha] < 2 < 50 10–30
Population density [cap/km2] < 40 < 400 3–10
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Fig. 3.10 The combined effect of development status and population density on per capita material
use (175 countries in the year 2000). (Based on Krausmann et al. 2008)
strong increase in the impact (or, rather, pressure) of humans per unit area. The
Boserupian idea that humans, specifically because of a higher density (and therefore
rising collaboration and inventiveness), could be able to buffer the negative impacts
of their increasingly intensive use upon the environment was partly true as far as
local and regional impacts in rich countries are concerned but not on a global or
long-term scale.
On a global level, nevertheless, the mitigating effect of population density can
be demonstrated. Both among developing (i.e., in the middle of a transition from
agrarian to industrial in the year 2000) and among fully industrialised countries,
countries with above-average population densities are able to provide their people’s
welfare at a substantially lower level of per capita consumption of natural resources
(Fig. 3.10). This finding relates to different patterns of (historically evolved) lifestyle
and consumption. Densely built urban centres, for example, demand much less in-
frastructure materials for supply, disposal and transportation (Weisz and Steinberger
2010), as well as less energy for heating and transport, than scattered settlements. In
the same vein, densely populated regions tend to develop a diet that is not as resource
(and area) demanding as the diet in regions where there is plenty of food available.
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In the opposite direction of causality, one finds natural resources (such as timber, or
mining products) being extracted preferably in low density areas, which boosts the
metabolic rates in these regions. High density areas are instead only the consumers
of these resources, and the “upstream flows” do not weigh on their metabolic rates.
This difference was considered so striking that UNEP based its scenarios of future
resource use on the assumption that developing countries, over the coming decades,
would tend to emulate the metabolic rates of industrial countries but maintain dif-
ferences according to population density (UNEP 2011). Nevertheless, the IRP came
to the conclusion that the already ongoing continuation of metabolic convergence
would lead to an untenable level of global resource use, running up not only against
all climate concerns but also against global resource constraints (fossil fuels, met-
als). Thus, Boserup, in contrast to most of her contemporaries, correctly viewed
population growth and density increase not just as rising but also as alleviating
environmental burdens.
3.5 Conclusion
Although Ester Boserup, in both her 1965 book and her 1981 book, provides one of the
most subtle and theoretically profound descriptions of the dynamics of agricultural
societies, she fails to perceive the qualitative differences introduced by the use of
fossil fuels. Her trust in human ingenuity makes her overlook the possibility of a
substantial overshoot of human use of resources beyond what the earth system may
provide us in the long run. Writing her later book a few years after Limits to Growth by
Meadow et al., she makes no reference to this work, as she had not done in her first
book to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (although the two women were personally
in contact12). Her personal engagement in favour of development opportunities,
her strong anti-Malthusian sentiment and her theoretical roots in classical political
economy did not allow her to see something obvious: that the widespread use of
fossil fuels disrupted the logic of the agricultural society so well analysed by her,
and that it created a new dynamic that may eventually eradicate the natural conditions
for human welfare on the Earth.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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12 According to personal communication with Faye Duchin.
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